



## *Russia Export Controls Communiqué*

*February 2024*

Two years ago, the export control agencies of the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States joined together to respond to Russia’s unconscionable full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This unprecedented approach to export control cooperation was broader in scope, more substantial in participation, and more rapid in execution than any effort before it.

As the war has progressed, this export control partnership has continued to grow stronger, with more sophisticated cooperation and more comprehensive controls. The approach to export controls adopted against Russia has been multilateral, with a substantially aligned international coalition and additional support from a number of governments who oppose being used by Russia to circumvent these international measures.

Together, we have moved to cut off Russia’s access to key inputs for its wartime economy, and together we have worked to spread the word about how Russia cannot continue its war against Ukraine without sophisticated equipment — everything from microelectronics to ball bearings to computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools — which Russia relies on but cannot produce.

Once a major arms exporter, Russia is increasingly unable to meet its heightened wartime demand in the face of shrinking supply. Russia has been left with no choice but to spend more of its dwindling national reserves, lower its ambitions for high tech weaponry, and make concessions to the other international pariah states it is increasingly reliant upon. The technology Russia is obtaining is not the elite level it wants and Russia is paying more for what it does get.

Russia is a determined adversary and has increasingly turned to circumvention to obtain the items it needs through illicit trade networks, often established in ostensibly neutral jurisdictions. The United States and our partners have responded by listing entities around the world when we learn of involvement in the transshipment of our or allied countries’ items to Russia. Following the most recent tranche of entity listings, over 200 companies located in third countries outside Russia have now been added to the Department of Commerce’s Entity List for this reason, cutting them off from all U.S. exports.

Wherever they are located, companies must understand the legal risks of transshipping items to Russia. Together with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom, we have developed and maintained the Common High Priority List (CHPL) to aid countries and companies in conducting necessary due diligence. This week we expanded the CHPL to include certain CNC machine tools and parts that Russia seeks. The CHPL clearly identifies the items that Russia uses for its war effort by six-digit harmonized system (HS) codes, which are harmonized around the world and known to every exporter, shipper, and freight forwarder. Shipping such items to Russia — or providing logistical, banking or other services to those who ship such items to Russia —

requires authorization; failure to comply carries a serious risk of sanction by the United States and our partners and allies.

This week, Japan hosted the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in Tokyo to further the work of our global partnership. These four partners have regularly met over the last two years to enhance ongoing alignment and implementation of our respective export control measures against Russia. We have partnered together during outreach events, including this week during the 30<sup>th</sup> Asian Export Control Seminar, to continue to share information on trade data and implementation efforts, and have built lasting relationships that will shape the future of export controls. In addition, our enforcement colleagues have also partnered together under the auspices of a G7 enforcement coordination mechanism, including having met this week to share enforcement information and best practices to prevent and deter Russian evasion.

This week marks a somber occasion, as it has now been two years since Russia fully committed to making a nonsensical war against a democratic neighbor, day by day making the world more hostile to millions of people seeking only to carry on with the normal tasks of living in a secure and free society. While export controls have not stopped Russia from its determination to subjugate its neighbor, they have slowed its progress and emphasized the collective belief that our most sensitive technologies must only be focused on peaceful endeavors.

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